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IS THEOCRACY OUR POLITICS?
Richard Primus*
Response to: William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349
(2015).
INTRODUCTION
In Is Originalism Our Law?, William Baude has made a good kind of
argument in favor of originalism. Rather than contending that originalism is the only coherent theory for interpreting a constitution, he makes
the more modest claim that it happens to be the way that American
judges interpret our Constitution.1 If he is right—if originalism is our
law—then judges deciding constitutional cases ought to be originalists.
But what exactly would the content of that obligation be? Calling
some interpretive method “our law” might suggest that judges have an
obligation to decide cases by reference to that method. But the account
of judicial behavior that Baude takes to show that originalism is our law
may say less about the norms of judicial decisionmaking than it says
about the norms of judicial discourse. Baude’s essay highlights something
signiﬁcant about the way judges talk, but it is not clear that this way of
talking constrains, or ought to constrain, the substance of what judges
decide.
Consider, by (partial) analogy to the way that judges talk about the
Founders, the way that politicians talk about God. Invoking God is a matter of traditional and broadly accepted practice among senior American
political ﬁgures. Many politicians probably feel that their role requires
them to participate in that practice. But it is not clear that these invocations of God by political leaders reveal a widely held theory of political
authority. The fact that senior officeholders speak about God has little
bearing on the substance of policymaking, and fortunately so, because
there are excellent reasons why the government should not set policy on
the basis of theological ideas. To be sure, one learns something about
American politics by noticing how politicians speak about God, just as
one learns something about American constitutionalism by noticing how
judges speak about the Founders. But it might exaggerate matters to describe our politics as theocratic, and it might exaggerate matters to describe our law as originalist.
*. Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, University of Michigan Law School.
Thanks to William Baude and Don Herzog.
1. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349, 2353 (2015).
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In Part I of this Essay, I describe Baude’s vision of “inclusive originalism.” In Part II, I ask how well inclusive originalism describes prevailing
judicial practice. In Part III, I develop the comparison between the practice of respectful engagement with original meanings in the judicial
sphere and the practice of respectful invocations of God by elected officials. The two practices are not entirely the same, of course. But it is
worth noting their similarities.
I. INCLUSIVE ORIGINALISM
Relative to some other arguments for originalism, Baude’s has considerable virtues. It does not rely on hard-to-defend claims about the inherent nature of law, or of constitutions, or of interpretation. It avoids
the dead-hand problem because it grounds the authority of original meanings not in actions that occurred long ago but in the practices of the
living.2 Moreover, and by the same token, Baude’s argument for originalism does not rely on the claim that the practices of American constitutional decisionmakers have always been originalist. It requires only that
originalism be the way that we do things now.3 This is a mature way to
argue that some set of practices is our law: Look and see what our legal
officials actually do.
To succeed, though, Baude needs to be able to survey what our legal
officials actually do and describe what he sees as originalism. A different
observer might ﬁnd that task daunting. After all, if you look to see what
judges do most of the time in constitutional cases, you will ﬁnd them
applying doctrine.4 Only rarely does a case turn on the text of the
Constitution or an account of original meanings.
To his credit, Baude does not pretend otherwise. He does not claim,
that is, that judges actually spend more time plumbing original meanings
than observers have previously realized. Instead, he offers a version of
originalism in which the fact that judges rarely traffic in arguments about
original meanings is compatible with the claim that originalism is our
law. He calls this model “inclusive originalism.”5 Under inclusive originalism, modes of decisionmaking that the Founders would have recognized
as legitimate are legitimate.6 Living as they did in a common-law world,
Baude says, the Founders surely accepted the application of judicial prec2. Id. at 2408 (explaining view that originalism is our law because we choose to
accept it).
3. Id. at 2389–90 (explaining if originalism is our law now because our current
practices accept it, then it is true originalism is our law now whether or not our practices
have consistently accepted originalism in past).
4. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 877, 883–84 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law] (describing dominant role of
doctrine in judicial decisions).
5. Baude, supra note 1, at 2354–63.
6. Id. at 2358.
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edent as a valid mode of legal decisionmaking.7 So that form of decisionmaking is in—not on its own bottom but because the Founders accepted it.
The same goes for interpretation that tracks the evolving meaning of
constitutional language, for the same reason, and for any other modality of
argument that the Founders would have considered legitimate.8
This is a capacious conception of originalism. Consider, by analogy,
what it would mean to describe as “textualist” a theory of constitutional
decisionmaking on which judges confronting individual-rights questions
should reason about what rights people have without reference to the
words of particular constitutional provisions. Given the Ninth Amendment,
one can perfectly well argue that the text of the Constitution directs constitutional decisionmakers to reason about rights in nontextual ways.9 So
it could make sense to describe nontextual reasoning as justiﬁed on the
basis of the text, just as it could make sense to describe a largely commonlaw process of constitutional interpretation as justiﬁed on the basis of a
Founding understanding. But someone who described judges making
moral arguments about unenumerated rights as practicing “textualism”
would not be using the term in a way that captures what textualism usually means in American constitutional discourse.10
The point here is not that Baude is wrong to call his approach a version of originalism. Nobody owns the term, and Baude tells his readers
clearly what he does and does not mean, and his idea shares something
important with the broader family of originalist theories: It maintains
that facts from the time of the Constitution’s enactment supply legitimacy
criteria for constitutional interpretation today.11 To be sure, Baude’s version of that legitimacy claim is importantly different from the legitimacy
claims on offer in some versions of originalism.12 For Baude, originalism
7. Id. at 2358–60.
8. See id. at 2352 (explaining inclusive originalism “allows for precedent and evolving interpretations only to the extent that the original meaning itself permits them”
(emphasis omitted)).
9. The Ninth Amendment provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
U.S. Const. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment is thus a constitutional text that states a
rule for interpreting the Constitution, and the rule it states is that the rights of the people
are not limited to those specified in the text. In other words, the Ninth Amendment recognizes the existence of rights beyond the constitutional text and directs constitutional interpreters not to limit themselves to the text when asking what rights people have.
10. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 38
(1980) (describing conflict between kind of reasoning that language of Ninth Amendment
directs and “interpretivism”—that is, textualism—of Justice Black); Richard Primus, Limits
of Interpretivism, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 159, 161–64, 167 (2008) [hereinafter Primus,
Limits of Interpretivism] (describing normal commitments of constitutional textualism).
11. Baude, supra note 1, at 2369.
12. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia’s account, on which the legitimacy of originalist interpretation was a matter of the authority of the democratic enactment of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
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is authoritative only because we accept it as a matter of practice.13 But my
use of the word “only” is meant to contrast Baude’s theory with some
other forms of originalism, not to suggest that a legal culture’s
acceptance in practice of a theory of interpretation is not a good reason
to deem that theory authoritative within that legal culture. If Baude can
show that the American legal system operates on the basis of something
he describes as “inclusive originalism,” he will not have demonstrated
that stronger forms of originalism are “our law,” but he will have made a
good case for the thing that he claims to be demonstrating.
Why, then, does Baude think that inclusive originalism describes
how American constitutional interpretation actually works? Baude points
principally to two features of judicial practice.14 First, judges regularly
speak about the Founders as if their ideas were authoritative.15 Second,
although it is true that courts reason about constitutional questions in
many ways besides inquiring into original constitutional meanings, the
Supreme Court never awards victory to some other modality of argument
in a conﬂict between that modality and the modality of original meanings.16 In a conﬂict between an original meaning and something else,
Baude says, the original meaning wins.17
II. DO AMERICAN JUDGES PRACTICE INCLUSIVE ORIGINALISM?
Below, I will examine the limits of those two claims. But ﬁrst, it is
worth noting a way in which those claims, even if accurate, would fall
short of establishing that existing judicial practice proceeds on the basis
of inclusive originalism.
Suppose it is true that judges speak about the Founders as authoritative figures and even genuinely regard them that way, and suppose it is also
true that judges only decide cases on the basis of nonoriginalist reasoning
when doing so does not contravene the authority of original meanings. It
need not follow that the reason why judges use those other forms of reaMatter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). It is
also worth noting that some leading originalists share Baude’s view that the reasons why
constitutional decisionmakers should be originalists are rooted in the present rather than
being imposed on us from the past. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution:
The Presumption of Liberty 4, 88 (2004) (arguing originalism is necessary because it follows from our present-day commitment to a written Constitution). But see Andrew B.
Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1025, 1028–29 (2010) (explaining why written constitutionalism does not require originalism).
13. Baude, supra note 1, at 2351–52 (explaining his argument for originalism is contingent in this respect).
14. Id. at 2365–86.
15. Id. at 2365–70 (noting judicial displays of respect for the ideas of the people who
wrote and ratified the Constitution).
16. Id. at 2370–86.
17. Id. at 2371 (“[I]n cases where the Court acknowledges a conflict between original
meaning or textual meaning and another source of constitutional meaning, the text and
original meaning prevail.”).
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soning—precedent, structure, nonoriginalist textual readings, nonoriginalist history, considerations of fairness, national ethos—is that the Founders
agreed to let them do so. If judges happen to decide cases with methods
accepted by the Founders but not because the Founders accepted them,
then the judges might not be acting as inclusive originalists after all, even
if an inclusive originalist would ﬁnd their choice of methods acceptable.
To establish that judicial practices implement inclusive originalism rather
than merely coincide with it, we would need evidence that judges from
an internal point of view understood their interpretive practices to be
governed by Founding-era choices, even when original meanings were
not directly at issue. In the absence of such evidence, it seems reasonable
to suspect that judges consider their pervasive use of nonoriginalist reasoning legitimate quite without reference to ideas about the Founders.
Few judges have gone through the exercise of labeling the different kinds
of interpretive moves they make and then seeking sanction for each kind
in the attitudes of the 1780s. Nor, on Baude’s ultimate account of interpretive legitimacy, should there be anything troubling about the possibility that judges deem their nonoriginalist modalities legitimate without
reference to the Founders. After all, Baude maintains that original meanings
are authoritative only because we treat them as such. The ﬁnal ground of
legitimacy is current acceptance. So if judges accept nonoriginalist reasoning in most cases, their acceptance of those methods is just as legitimating regardless of whether it runs through an understanding about
what the Founders thought.
Baude does not supply evidence that judges understand their use of
nonoriginalist methods in most of the cases they decide as legitimate on
the particular grounds suggested by inclusive originalism.18 But if judges
are not really inclusive originalists over this domain, the damage to
Baude’s theory is only partial. He could still maintain that originalism is
our law in the crucial sense that original meanings are treated as authoritative, and as not defeasible on nonoriginalist grounds, in those cases in
which dispositive original meanings are available. That would be a point
worth demonstrating, and I take it to be the point that Baude’s two observations about judicial practice are actually meant to establish.19
18. Nor would a correspondence between the methods judges use and the methods
that the Founders would have considered appropriate be particularly strong evidence that
judges today consider those methods appropriate because the Founders did so, even if
judges today are not conscious of the causal relationship. It is at least as plausible that such
a correspondence exists—if it does exist—because the relevant methods seem sensible to
people trained in the traditions of English-speaking law. In other words, people today
might consider precedential authority sensible for reasons much like the reasons that the
Founders thought precedential authority sensible, rather than because the Founders in
particular thought it sensible. English-speaking judges in both 1700 and 1900 considered
precedential authority sensible, too; there may be nothing special about the Founding
moment where attitudes about appropriate interpretive methods are concerned.
19. In the remainder of these thoughts, I will use the term “inclusive originalism” to
mean the part of Baude’s theory that sees the Founders as authoritative and original mean-
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The ﬁrst of Baude’s two observations seems true as far as it goes.
Judges and other actors do frequently speak about the Founders and
about original meanings as if they were authoritative in constitutional
law.20 That feature of our practices is not sufficient to establish the conclusion that original meanings are “our law,” but Baude is right to think
that it helps. And to his credit, Baude does not claim that this practice is
sufficient, standing alone, to establish his conclusion.
The second observation is meant to bear more weight. When the Supreme
Court decides cases, Baude says, it never adjudicates a conﬂict between
an original meaning and some other potential source of authority by deciding against the original meaning.21 Yes, the Court often decides without
reference to original meanings, and sometimes the Court struggles with
an original-meaning question and ﬁnds no conclusive answer before disposing of a case on other grounds. But when the Court decides a case on
nonoriginalist grounds, it never says, “What we decide today contradicts
the original meaning of the Constitution.” Instead, the Justices either say
that the original meaning yields no clear answer to the question or else
say nothing at all about original meanings—perhaps because no answer
could be derived that way.22 By refusing to contradict original meanings
affirmatively, Baude maintains, the Court signals that original meaning is
the master modality.23 Other modalities will do when original meaning is
unavailable, but none of those other modalities can withstand the trumping form of constitutional authority: the original meaning.
The obvious challenge that Baude faces at this stage of his argument
is that most experts think that the Court has frequently decided cases in
ings as trumping other kinds of constitutional reasons, without respect to the further claim
that those other kinds of reasons are admissible only because the Founders would have
accepted them.
20. For example, Baude quotes Justice Kagan as making the following statement at
her confirmation hearings: “[S]ometimes [the Framers] laid down very specific rules, sometimes they laid down broad principles. Either way, we apply what they say, what they meant
to do.” See Baude, supra note 1, at 2352 (alteration in original); see also Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (invoking image of
Framers as “practical statesmen” rather than “metaphysical philosophers” to support argument that Commerce Clause recognizes distinction between activity and inactivity). That
the distinction between activity and inactivity is itself metaphysical is beside the point; it
goes only to the cogency of the Chief Justice’s use of the Framers rather than to the fact of
his invoking them as authoritative.
21. Baude, supra note 1, at 2371.
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (explaining Court had
devoted considerable energy to question of original meaning of Fourteenth Amendment
and had reached view that inquiry was “inconclusive”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing relevant
sources bearing on original meanings as “enigmatic” and “largely cancel[ing] each other”
rather than directing any particular resolution to question at issue).
23. See Baude, supra note 1, at 2371, 2375 (noting “Court’s periodic rejection of
precedent in favor of original meaning suggests that precedent is not the ultimate source
of law” and that “original meaning may be one of the most powerful bases for overturning
precedent” (emphasis omitted)).

50

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR

[Vol. 116:44

ways that contradict original meanings. Indeed, this understanding is
common ground between nonoriginalists like Strauss (who argue that
the Court’s nonoriginalist behavior demonstrates that originalism is not
really our law)24 and many conﬁrmed originalists (who argue that the
Court has behaved poorly).25 Modern originalism arose largely as a critique of landmark twentieth-century decisions, from Brown to Reynolds to
Miranda to Roe, all of which were said to betray original meanings.26 Obviously, the idea that a Court faithful to original meanings would not have
produced those decisions is in tension with Baude’s claim that the
Court’s practice is actually originalist.
So Baude gamely sets out to do exactly what he needs to do to make
his point plausible: He reads the putatively anti-originalist cases closely
and argues that in none of them did the Court reject the authority of
original meanings.27 What the Court has really done, he contends, is
“ﬁght[] the original-meaning question to a draw”28 and then decide on
other grounds. In Brown, for example, the Court declared the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause “inconclusive,” rather than saying that the original meaning permitted segregation but was now to be
set aside.29 Blaisdell, Miranda, Gideon, Roe, the sex-equality cases, Lawrence,
and even Obergefell are all consistent with a judicial commitment to originalism, Baude argues, despite the fact that many people have thought
otherwise.30 In all of those cases the Court claimed that original meanings are ambiguous or even argued that the people who framed the
applicable provisions delegated the relevant questions to the future, rather than announcing itself as superseding originalist authority.
To be sure, Baude acknowledges, the Court may not always have gotten
the original-meaning questions right.31 Maybe the Court erred by thinking
that it could forbid school segregation or require same-sex marriage with24. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 35–36 (2010) (arguing dominant
interpretive method of American constitutional law is common-law interpretation rather
than textualism or originalism).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–602 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (describing half century of Court’s Commerce Clause decisions as unfortunate departure from original meanings).
26. For descriptions of the rise of originalism, see, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of
the People 306–13 (2009); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 599, 599–612 (2004).
27. See Baude, supra note 1, at 2376–86 (arguing claims that Court has “‘expressly
rejected originalism’” are “mistaken” "(quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, The Elusive Quest for
Value Neutral Judging: A Response to Redish and Arnould, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1539, 1541
(2012))).
28. Id. at 2380.
29. Id. at 2380–81.
30. See id. at 2376–86 (reviewing cases “that have been argued to show that originalism is not the law, or not the ultimate account of our legal practice”).
31. See id. at 2377 (“It may well be that the outcome of Blaisdell was wrong as a matter of original meaning . . . .”).
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out distorting the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning. But, Baude
continues, the quality of the Court’s execution is not the question.32 The
question is whether the Court exhibits a sense of obligation to be bound
by original meanings. Based on the way the Court discusses original
meanings, Baude thinks the answer to that question is yes.33
Baude is on to something important here. Even in the cases canonically adduced as anti-originalist decisions, the Court refrains from saying
that some other source of authority trumps original meanings.34 That
feature of our practices is sufficiently robust that it probably does mean
something. But what exactly does it mean? Baude says it means that originalism is “our law.”35 But if so, “our law” might have to refer to something that exercises little or no constraining force with respect to the decisions that the Court makes. If a Court exhibiting an obligation to be
bound by original meanings can produce Blaisdell and Brown and Gideon
and Roe and Heller and Obergefell, then a Court exhibiting that obligation
might be able to reach pretty much the same range of outcomes that a
Court not exhibiting that obligation might reach. If so, it would follow
that “our law” is not something that much constrains decisionmakers in
their disposition of cases. And that people who are interested in how
courts decide cases should not much care whether our law is originalism
as opposed to something else.
An inclusive originalist might be tempted to offer the following response: The Court’s sense of its obligation to respect original meanings
has in practice done little work as a constraint on the Court’s decisionmaking, but that is because the Court’s understanding of original meanings has been sloppy. If American lawyers recognize that originalism is
our law and commit to doing the hard work of identifying original meanings correctly, then the profession’s sense of original meanings will
sharpen and original meanings will constrain future Courts more than
they have constrained the Court in the past.36 That response, however,
cannot simply emerge from pointing to our present practices because it
is a response that calls for those practices to change. The argument on
offer identiﬁes inclusive originalism as our law by submitting that inclusive originalism is what the Court has already been doing. It is what the

32. See id. at 2371 (“The point of looking at these cases is not to ask whether the
Supreme Court’s decisions are correct as a matter of original meaning.”).
33. See id. (“[T]he point is to look to how the Supreme Court justifies its rulings, as
evidence of what counts as a legally sufficient justification in our current system of constitutional law.”).
34. See id. at 2373 (“Rather, the majority first concludes that the text is ‘ambiguous,’
looking to the text and structure of the Constitution and evidence of its original
meaning.”).
35. Id. at 2352.
36. See id. at 2358 (stating that resolving questions about what interpretive moves
inclusive originalism is properly understood to permit “will require doing the historical
and interpretive work”).
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Court has been doing that is our law, and a big part of what the Court has
been doing is deciding cases like Blaisdell and Brown and Gideon and Roe
and Heller and Obergefell. If the fact that the Court articulates ﬁdelity to
the Founders is data about what our law is, then so, perhaps, is the fact
that the Court frequently decides cases in ways that are not consistent
with original meanings.
To be sure, an argument that looks to existing practice is not per se
disabled from arguing that the best understanding of the practice would
recommend certain reforms. If we are conﬁdent that we understand how
a practice works and the functions it is supposed to serve, we might also
be in a position to point out ways in which its operation can be improved.
It is in that spirit, I suspect, that Baude wants to privilege the discursive
part of this practice over the decisional part. “Our law,” in his view, is
more reﬂected in what judges say about their obligations than in how
they execute those obligations. If the execution fails to show the respect
for original meanings that the discourse seems to acknowledge, the execution is wanting.
But that idea rests on two uncertain propositions. The ﬁrst is that if
indeed we should do a better job of aligning constitutional discourse
with constitutional decisionmaking, it is our discourse that should be regarded as more authoritative. That proposition cannot emerge from the
record of practice alone, and it is not clear that we would choose that
resolution if the question were squarely put. Maybe the discursive practice
of speaking respectfully about original meanings persists in part because
it exercises little constraint on decisionmaking. If we had to choose one
or the other, perhaps we would (and should) choose to abandon the discursive pretense of originalism.
The second proposition is that the practice is in need of reform at
all—that is, that the tension between the judiciary’s spoken respect for
the Founders and its willingness to reach results inconsistent with original meanings is a problem in need of resolution. Maybe it is. But Baude’s
argument asks us to take existing practices as authoritative, and judicial
practice on these points seems robust and relatively stable. So before we
conclude that the disjuncture between the way that judges speak about
original meanings and the ways that courts decide cases is a glitch to be
repaired, we should ask whether the system’s current operation has a
logic of its own.
Here is one possibility for such a logic. Perhaps judicial professions
of respect for original meanings serve important functions in constitutional culture even if historical realities about the original meanings of
constitutional provisions do not much constrain, and in principle should
not much constrain, the resolution of contested constitutional issues.
Perhaps the relevant discourse sounds more in national identity than in
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concrete decisionmaking.37 And to see how judicial discourse about the
Founders might be understood that way, it is helpful to investigate a question parallel to the one that Baude asks and to do so with a similar sort of
positive inquiry. The question is this: Is theocracy our politics?
III. IS THEOCRACY OUR POLITICS?
The positive inquiry begins by looking at the behavior of our senior
political officials. On a regular basis, they make reference to God.38
When they do so, it is always respectfully, even reverentially. They speak
of the need to keep faith with God, to act as God would have us act, and
so forth.39 They do not always, nor even most of the time, adduce the
Divine Will as the proximate reason for particular policy decisions. And
maybe politicians are often wrong about what God wants, as indeed some
of them must be, given how often different people represent God as taking different sides of an issue. Never, though, will you hear a senior American
politician say that she has canvassed several possible reasons for action,
one of which is God’s will, and concluded that God’s will should be overcome. That’s out.
Should we conclude, on the basis of this evidence, that divine authority is the master modality of American political reasoning? I suppose
we could. But what would it mean to say so? Perhaps that speaking respectfully about God is a deeply engrained feature of American political
discourse, one that reﬂects certain values and self-conceptions common
among the decisionmaking classes and the constituents to whom they
respond. It might not follow, though, that theological inquiry would tell
us much about how political issues will be or ought to be decided. In37. See Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. See
Also 79, 80 (2010) (“[T]he deeper power of originalist argument sounds in the romance
of national identity.”).
38. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29,
2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012911.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (closing speech by invoking God's blessing); President William Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 1999), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou99.htm [http://perma.cc/Y
9CN-RK26] (same); President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-oba
ma-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-state-union-address [http://perma.cc/FZ8H-7F8T] (same);
see also Scott Neuman, Divine Rhetoric: God in the Inaugural Address, NPR (Jan. 22,
2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/01/22/169998659/divine-rhetoricgod-in-the-inaugural-address [http://perma.cc/BD88-BZ2A] (tracking emergence and now
prevalence of references to God in inaugural speeches).
39. See, e.g., Samuel Smith, Hillary Clinton on Her Christian Faith: Judgment Left to
God; Be Open, Tolerant, Respectful, Christian Post (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.christ
ianpost.com/news/hillary-clinton-christian-faith-judgment-god-open-tolerant-respectful-15
5964/ [http://perma.cc/66WF-GUCC] (quoting Senator Hillary Clinton at Iowa campaign event saying, “[T]he most important commandment is to love the Lord with all your
might and to love your neighbor as yourself, and that is what I think we are commanded
by Christ to do”).
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deed, it is not clear that our observation about how politicians discuss
God tells much at all about the commitments of American politics beyond the particular commitment to speak this way, or to speak this way at
certain times and for certain audiences—audiences that might or might
not include the speakers themselves.
The prevailing practice of invoking God probably means different
things to different politicians, and different politicians probably use it in
different ways. Some politicians may be deeply invested in the idea that
they are responsible to see God’s will done on earth. Others might see
the theological language mostly as a matter of “ceremonial deism”–
roughly speaking, as a traditional way of solemnizing an occasion or a
role, but not as a statement about the kinds of reasons that should count
in politics.40 Others invoke God because they think some audience expects it of them. Probably some politicians rarely think about politics or
policy in theological terms—indeed, maybe they have principled reasons
for thinking that policy decisions should not try to track theological imperatives—but are well enough socialized into the practices of American
politics that they speak this way on certain occasions. And a great many
may have no well-theorized view about why they do it but either move
among self-understandings from occasion to occasion or else engage in
the practice with little reﬂection at all.
The practice of invoking God in politics might serve several functions, including legitimacy functions, but it is not clear that it reveals a
thick theory of political authority, nor that it directs official decisionmaking. Most decisions are made on other grounds. And when a politician
does adduce God’s preferences as a reason, you can be sure that God’s
preferences, as described, will cohere with what the speaker thinks is a
good idea. Senior politicians never award victory over God to some other
source of authority, but then again we never hear them saying, “Most of
the reasons bearing on this very important issue direct resolution X, but
God directs not-X. So, unfortunate as this is, not-X is the decision we
must make.”
Something similar may be true of originalism. Most American judges
have a general sense of reverence for the Founders. Some are committed
originalists, in a sense stricter than Baude’s.41 Most others probably think
40. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[S]uch practices as the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance can best
be understood . . . as a form [of] ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected from Establishment
Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content.”).
41. Justice Thomas is a leading example. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742, 806–58 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that substance of Second Amendment should apply to states not through Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as longstanding incorporation doctrine would suggest,
but through Privileges and Immunities Clause, on basis of proper understanding of original meaning of Fourteenth Amendment).
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that the ideas and understandings of the Founders matter in some way
but without any clearly worked out idea about exactly how and how
much.42 They speak about the Founders as objects of ﬁdelity.43 Most of
the time, however, actual judicial decisionmaking seems to rest on other
considerations, chief among which is precedential case law.44 And even
on those occasions when courts purport to be deciding questions based
on original meanings, it is not clear that the decisions judges reach are
genuinely constrained by historical reality. Sometimes, perhaps. But most
of the time, what judges say the original meaning of a constitutional provision requires in a given case either reﬂects what prior courts have said
about the original meaning (in which case the authority on offer is precedential) or, in matters of ﬁrst impression and cases in which judges
depart from precedent, lines up uncannily well with what those judges
think should be done in the case at hand on other grounds.45 In short, to
the extent that originalism is “our law,” it might reside mostly in that part
of our law that sets norms for how to argue about constitutional issues,
rather than in that part of our law that sets norms governing the substantive resolution of those issues.
Baude’s description of the Supreme Court’s conduct in cases commonly thought to depart from originalism contains a helpful image for
recognizing the possibility that judicial discussions of original meanings
sound more in our law’s discursive register than in its decisional one. In
Brown, the Court did not say, “We rule in a way that is contrary to the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Instead, Baude says,
the Court invested effort in “ﬁghting the original-meaning question to a
draw.”46 That seems right.
But why would a court invest effort in ﬁghting original meanings to a
draw if that court really thought that original meanings supplied the
master legitimating criteria for judicial decisionmaking? To ﬁght original
meanings to a draw is to resist the direction in which original meanings
are trying to take you. It is not the same as working hard to make sure
42. Few law professors do either, even among those who write about constitutional
theory. It seems extravagant to expect more from judges, who must spend most of their
time worrying about other things.
43. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.) (rejecting any conception of commerce power that would authorize government to compel private action on grounds that such conception would make United
States “not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned”); Planned Parenthood
of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“Our Constitution is a
covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us . . . .”).
44. See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 4, at 899–900 (describing predominance
of case law in judicial reasoning).
45. For one list of cases in which the Justices divided on questions of original meaning in a pattern that suggests that their conceptions of original meaning largely map their
conceptions of the merits of the cases on other grounds, see Primus, Limits of Interpretivism,
supra note 10, at 170–71.
46. Baude, supra note 1, at 2380.
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that one has gotten the original meaning right in a discipline-of-history
sense. If we thought that the Court in Brown had worked hard to get original meanings right, happened to conclude after that inquiry that original meanings were inconclusive, and therefore decided the case on the
basis of a different kind of reasoning, then it would make sense to read
Brown as consistent with the idea that the Court behaves as if original
meanings supplied the best reasons for constitutional decisions. But if we
think that the Court affirmatively strove to characterize the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that would permit the Court
to rule against segregation, then a different possibility emerges. Maybe
the Court feels an obligation to show ﬁdelity to original meanings—or at
least to avoid showing inﬁdelity to them—but not an obligation passively
to follow original meanings wherever they might lead. Maybe “our law,”
as displayed in prevailing practices, is that the Court should avoid rejecting original meanings overtly. Maybe the Court’s treatment of original
meanings reﬂects the sense that our discursive norms require judges to
describe themselves as faithful to the makers of the Constitution even
when judicial decisions are not meaningfully constrained by Founding
ones.
Baude tries to meet this counterargument. Some people, he says,
think that judicial professions of ﬁdelity to original meanings are just
talk—talk that does not drive decisionmaking.47 But if that account of
judicial behavior were accurate, Baude continues, it would reveal the
judges as duplicitous, and the secret motives animating their duplicity
cannot have the status of law.48 Whether or not judicial reason-giving is
authentic, judicial opinions tell us what sorts of reasons judges think will
legitimate their decisions publicly. If the judges are really acting for other
reasons that they conceal, then the fact that they feel the need to hide
their real reasons indicates that the judges consider those reasons to lack
legitimacy. Indeed, to the extent that the judges’ secret reasons are directing results contrary to the results that would be directed by a proper
application of the sources of authority that the judges are comfortable
adducing in public, Baude claims, the judges are subverting the law.49
The trouble with Baude’s response here is that it treats the hypothesis that judges’ discussions of original meanings do not tell us the real
reasons for judicial action as if it were a hypothesis about bad-faith behavior. (The relevant section of Baude’s essay is called “judicial insincerity,”
and his characteristically colorful argument against treating secret reasons as legitimate analogizes the judiciary to an Illuminati conspiracy.50)
But the best form of the hypothesis does not propose that the judges are
47. See id. at 2386–87 (stating many scholars suggest judges’ articulated reasoning might
not provide best account of what drives judicial decisionmaking).
48. See id. at 2388 (arguing judges subvert law if they rule for reasons they do not reveal rather than for publicly justifiable reasons).
49. Id. at 2396–97.
50. Id. at 2386–89.
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acting in bad faith. My own guess is that originalist argumentation suffers
from motivated reasoning more than it suffers from purposeful duplicity.
That is, judges and other constitutional interpreters are liable to misread
originalist source material in ways congenial to their own preferred dispositions of cases, even if they are not consciously trying to distort the
sources. When they do misread, they may sincerely believe that their actions
accord with original meanings. But it is still not the case that original
meanings drive the decision. Instead, creating an interpretation of original meanings that reconciles those meanings with the desired outcome
becomes a step in the decisionmaking process. The reconciliation might
or might not satisfy a panel of disinterested historians, but that is not the
point. The question is whether the judge, who is under pressure both to
decide the case well and to avoid inﬁdelity to the Founders, can produce
a reconciliation good enough to live with. And as Professor Karl Llewellyn
warned, “What satisﬁes the conscience lulls the mind.”51
The indeterminacy of original meanings helps judges immensely as
they pursue this project. Originalist source material is regularly messy,
unbounded, and multivocal.52 Unlike case law, it is not hierarchically organized, and again unlike case law, it does not adapt over time in ways
that settle newly presented questions. On the contrary, as originalist
source material recedes farther into the past, it cleanly answers fewer and
fewer of the questions that modern judges need to decide.53 What happens when judges approach this indeterminate source material? In general, the judges conclude that original meanings justify some course of
action that the judges probably thought was the right course of action
anyway.
This is true both when the right course of action is a matter of consensus and when it is a matter of disagreement. On the ﬁrst score, it is
not an accident that the Court became willing to credit Brown’s reading
of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause at the same point
in history when American elites more generally came to oppose overtly
racist government policies. On the second, only Captain Renault could
have been shocked to ﬁnd,54 upon reading the Court’s decision in Heller,
that Justices Scalia and Breyer had different views about what originalist
source material revealed about Founding-era attitudes toward ﬁrearms

51. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10
(1934).
52. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L.
Rev. 165, 214 (2008) (“[W]hen [originalist material] speaks in many voices, there is no way
to settle the question of whether a view expressed in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
is more or less authoritative than a view expressed in the newspapers of Massachusetts.”).
53. Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1295, 1344
(2008) (discussing expiring justifications for originalism).
54. See Casablanca (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942) (“I’m shocked—shocked—to find
that gambling is going on in here.”).

58

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR

[Vol. 116:44

regulation.55 Or that those same two Justices had different views about
what originalist source material revealed about Article II’s Appointments
Clause in NLRB v. Noel Canning.56 Everyone could have predicted, in
each case, which interpretation would appeal to Justice Breyer and which
one to Justice Scalia—and not because the two Justices had different methodological commitments about how to read historical sources.
It would be a big mistake, however, to conclude that these predictable patterns in interpretation come about because judges deliberately
manipulate the sources to reach their desired ends. Maybe that does happen, sometimes. But most of the time, there is a different reason why
judges’ interpretations of originalist source material tend to track their
intuitions about sensible results. It is that judges are usually responsible
people who want to make good decisions, and they have intuitions about
what good decisions would be, and they have the further intuition that
the Founders, too, were responsible people who had good values and
who made good decisions. If one thinks well of the Founders, then one
will more naturally read their indeterminate writings as supporting a
sensible idea than as supporting a foolish one—and all the more so if the
exercise is not the academic one of establishing the historicity of an idea
but the legal one of deploying the power of the state to enforce some
result in the social world.
When judges strive to avoid dissonance between their decisions and
their understandings of original meanings, therefore, they are not as a
general matter trying to fool the public. Maybe they are fooling themselves, and maybe their role pressures them to do so. Or maybe they are
playing an important and noncynical role in a system that values its sense
of identiﬁcation with the Founders: Perhaps what our practices require is
for judges to endorse a new conception of original meanings when it is
time for the law to change because the alternative is to leave the Founders
behind, and we like the Founders too much to do that. If so, then our
practices do suggest that original meanings are an important modality of
argument—but one whose content adapts to the direction of judicial
decisionmaking at least as much as it constrains that direction.
Baude might say that even if all of this is true, the fact that judges are
unwilling simply to contradict original meanings shows that our practices
55. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (Scalia, J.)
(“From our review of founding-era sources, we conclude that this natural meaning was
also the meaning that ‘bear arms’ had in the 18th century. In numerous instances, ‘bear
arms’ was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized
militia.”), with id. at 672 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing founding-era sources “confirmed
the way those in the founding generation viewed firearm ownership: as a duty linked to
military service”).
56. Compare 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (Breyer, J.) (“The Founders themselves
used the word [‘recess’] to refer to intra-session, as well as to inter-session, breaks.”), with
id. at 2595–96 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In the Founding era, the terms
‘recess’ and ‘session’ had well-understood meanings in the marking out of legislative
time . . . . The period between two sessions was known as ‘the recess.’”).
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embody the idea that original meanings are authoritative.57 But whether
that contention is sound depends on what it means to regard original
meanings as authoritative. If it means that we resist letting the law develop in ways that we ﬁnd ourselves unable to reconcile with what we believe
about the Founders, then it is probably right. But we seem pretty proﬁcient at believing new things about the Founders when doing so is necessary for letting the law develop—including, when it provides the easiest
reconciliation, that the Founders did not speak to an issue, such that we
are free to decide it on other grounds.58 And if the claim that we regard
original meanings as authoritative means that we are committed to
obeying some static understanding of original constitutional meanings,
or to obeying original constitutional meanings as a team of skilled and
dispassionate historians would understand them, then it is probably
wrong. At any rate, our practices cannot support those versions of the
claim, because our practices do not furnish any robust evidence of the
Court’s unwillingness to budge from concededly unfortunate rules
simply because original meanings require them. When the shoe pinches,
the Court tends to ﬁnd a better shoe.
CONCLUSION
Baude’s argument asks us to take existing practices as authoritative.
But it reads better as a proposal for reform than as a statement that everything is just ﬁne as it is. Baude wants us to recognize that we already
accept inclusive originalism and, based on that realization, to be better
originalists than we have been heretofore.
Recall that Baude’s theory requires him to say that the Court in
Brown (and Blaisdell, and Reynolds, and Miranda, and Gideon, and Roe, and
Lawrence, and Heller, and . . . ) may have been doing originalism badly. In
a way, that concession is a strength. It prevents Baude from suffering the
quizzical reactions he might get if he tried to argue that all of those cases,
or even most of them, were rightly decided as a matter of original meaning. More broadly, it recognizes both the general reality that courts err
and the particular reality that courts are not so good at the kind of histor57. Baude, supra note 1, at 2371.
58. The changing views within the legal profession regarding the original meaning of
the Second Amendment in the twenty years before Heller illustrate the scenario in which a
new view of original meanings is used to direct a change in the law. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel,
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191,
193–94 (2008) (describing process by which lawyers, judges, and law professors came to
adopt new view of original meaning of Second Amendment). The Court’s treatment of the
original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in Brown illustrates the scenario in which
a changing view of original meanings is used to permit such a change. See Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 63–
65 (1955) (describing process by which Brown Court arrived at view that it could order
school desegregation despite earlier prevailing sense that Fourteenth Amendment was
compatible with segregation).
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ical inquiry that originalism officially requires. For present purposes,
though, what matters is this: When Baude says that some of the Court’s
decisions might be wrongly decided as a matter of original meaning, he
is saying, I think, that some of those decisions are blemishes on the
Court’s record—occasions when the Court failed to live up to what it
knew it was supposed to do, which is to respect original meanings. Once
we recognize that we are committed to originalism, the thought would
run, we should commit ourselves to doing originalism better, and then we
will make fewer mistakes.
An argument that locates our commitments in our practices cannot
so easily make that move. The only form of originalism that our practices
clearly embody is a form riddled with “errors” of this kind. If the Court
were more constant and scrupulous with its assessments of history, our
practices would be different. And it is far from clear that our practice of
avoiding overt admissions of conﬂict between original meanings and judicial decisions would survive if it meant that we could not have Brown, or
Reynolds, or Lawrence. On the contrary, the pliability of originalist argument might be a precondition for the longevity of our practice of (sincerely) declaring ﬁdelity with original meanings.
So perhaps the Court’s periodic-to-regular decisions that strike dispassionate historians as departing from original meanings are not actually errors, measured by the commitments of our practices, properly understood. Maybe the ability to adapt and engineer the Constitution’s
“original meaning” is a feature of the system rather than a bug, in part
because it allows us to continue expressing something that the system
values: connection with and respect for the Founders. And if not—if it is
unacceptable to present our constitutional law as consistent with original
meanings if such a presentation requires taking liberties with history,
whether knowingly or otherwise—then the choice between a more constraining originalism and a more open rejection of originalism cannot be
made simply by treating our present practices as authoritative. It would
require other kinds of arguments—arguments about the institutional
capabilities and limits of courts and arguments about the functions and
values of constitutional law.
Baude is right that it matters how judges talk.59 It tells us something
about either their own commitments or their perceptions of the commitments and expectations of some part of their audience. If judges profess
respect for the Founders and refuse to contradict original meanings,
then those practices are part of our legal culture. But those practices are
part of our legal culture in the way that they actually are practiced, not in
some more reﬁned way. And if we think that the practice is in need of
some reform, the best reform might involve less originalism rather than
more. To know, we would need a different kind of argument.

59. Baude, supra note 1, at 2386–88.

